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ABSTRACT
In the following thesis, American populism’s many manifestations throughout American
history as well as its current forms in contemporary politics will be analyzed mainly through the
lens of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, who are two prominent political figures that have
managed to amass a considerable degree of support. In Trump’s case, his populist rhetoric and
authoritarian slant has allowed him to garner enough support to ascend to the position of
President of the United States of America, arguably one of the most powerful political positions
on planet Earth. Current trends such as dissatisfaction amongst the voting constituencies of
Democrats and Republicans, rises in authoritarian attitudes amongst voters, neoliberalism, and
free trade’s implications on the American worker, and more will be analyzed in order to
understand the popularity of these two political figures and the populist language they employ in
their policies and rhetoric.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In 2016, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th president of the United States of America
without support from the Republican establishment, which up until that point, was an almost
unheard-of phenomenon in American politics. In the 2020 Democratic Primary, Bernie Sanders,
a self-proclaimed Socialist, performed exceptionally well while also campaigning without
support from the Democratic Establishment, which saw him as too radical to win a presidential
election. Outside of policy differences, the major difference between both candidates’ campaigns
was that the Republican establishment was unable to stop Donald Trump’s ascension to the
office of President while the Democrats were able to basically handicap Sanders’ campaign after
Super Tuesday, and the subsequent endorsements for Joe Biden that it led to. Although there are
many similarities between the two political parties, this stark disparity in the success of two
popular outsiders highlights the differences between the two parties that could lead to these
differing outcomes. This could possibly be attributed to a variety of factors, such as differing
voting constituencies, party mechanisms, distances between outsider policy platforms and the
policy platforms of the established political parties, corporatist interests, donors, differences in
primary election mechanisms, etc. Why was the Republican Party so susceptible to a hostile
takeover led by a populist political outsider? Is the Democratic establishment a more powerful
and institutionalized faction than the Republican establishment? Is Trump’s brand of
authoritarian populism more appealing to a plurality of voters all over the country than Sanders’s
brand of populism? Is there a rise in public support for authoritarian populism that has allowed
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candidates such as Trump to acquire widespread, unprecedented support? Needless to say, the
parties are very different, and the successes and failures of Trump and Sanders offer an
interesting insight into the fundamental differences between the Republican Party and the
Democratic Party.
Many people who aren’t particularly knowledgeable about or interested in contemporary
American politics would struggle to find any commonalities between the two candidates. On the
surface, they seem to be two polar opposites existing on the conventional left-right political
spectrum. However, a more in-depth and detailed analysis will quickly reveal that both
candidates have adopted the rhetoric and messaging of populism, and both candidates share a lot
of common ground in their empirical analysis of the institutions and problems plaguing the
American political system. Populism is a political logic that exists outside of the conventional
left-right political spectrum that many use to analyze American politics (Judis, 2016). Rather
than being tethered to one end of the political spectrum, populism has a chameleon-like nature
that allows politicians of all political persuasions and ideologies to utilize populist messaging
and rhetoric. This unique facet of populism has allowed this political logic to have been adopted
by a variety of candidates and movements throughout American history, from The People’s Party
to Huey Long to the Tea Party, and eventually, to Donald Trump. Throughout American history,
however, populist candidates and political movements would rarely garner enough support for
them to ever be elected to any influential positions of power and they were regularly seen as
protest candidates, but never as serious political contenders. Until recently, that is. Bernie
Sanders and Donald Trump both exist and operate outside of their respective party
establishments, and both are seen as alternative candidates that offer a different policy platform
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and outlook than the conventional candidates that have emerged from the interior of the
Democrat and Republican parties. Trump differs from many establishment Republican neocons
in his condemnation of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and his push to bring American troops
back home. Sanders differs from many establishment Democrats in his “socialist” policy
platform and his condemnation of the late 20th-century liberal consensus and all the problems it
brought with it, such as outsourcing, global economic competition, declining wages, etc. Outside
of Sanders’s endorsement of “democratic socialism”, he has shared many positions with Trump,
including the examples previously mentioned of non-interventionism (resembling Trump’s
“America First” messaging) and his condemnation of the neo-liberal consensus and the
subsequent decline of American manufacturing that it led to.

What is Populism?
Populism makes two core claims about the manner in which societies should be
governed. The first is a heightened skepticism of the legitimate authority of the ‘establishment’.
It claims that the epicenters of power in any given country are corrupt and operate in selfinterest, commonly attributing blame to a variety of institutions such as the media, politicians,
lobbyists, political parties, intellectuals, etc. Legitimacy can best be understood as the capacity
for a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are
the most appropriate and proper ones for society (Lipset, 1959). Legitimacy is what causes
citizens to voluntarily follow the laws of their respective countries rather than doing so simply to
avoid punishment. Given this definition, one can infer that a rise in populism indicates a decline
of public trust in legitimate sources of political power.
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The second claim is that the only legitimate source of authority in a functioning
democracy flows directly from ‘the people’ (Norris, Inglehart, 2019). This claim serves almost as
a prioritization of the voices of regular citizens over expert judgments, which happen to usually
come from established sources of power (‘the establishment’). In this sense, populist rhetoric
tends to erode trust in the governmental systems and elected representatives of liberal
democracies. The decline in trust for the status quo politicians that favor incremental reforms
rather than radical changes has led to a rise in popularity for more far-left and far-right
alternative candidates such as Sanders and Trump while simultaneously exacerbating political
polarization.
The neoliberal consensus between the two political parties has caused cultural issues to
be at the forefront of the American political dialogue, and this only causes more divisiveness and
political polarization. Economic policy discussions allow for compromise and negotiation, as tax
rates, welfare spending, and other adjacent economic policies are issues that can be negotiated
incrementally. Cultural issues, however, tend to divide people into ‘Us-versus-Them’ groups,
and any sign of compromise is seen by either side as a moral weakness (Norris, Inglehart, 2019).
This political polarization and the cycle of divisiveness has pushed both parties toward their
ideological poles, moving Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right, and this, in turn,
leads to even less compromise and results in political gridlock whenever either party tries to pass
legislation. Thus, both party’s inefficiencies in passing meaningful and impactful legislation
have allowed party outsiders to garner an incredible amount of support in recent years, leading to
a Trump presidency.
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Although populism’s rhetoric can be adopted by a plethora of different candidates and
movements with differing ideologies and political persuasions, there are two major forms of
populism. The first is authoritarian populism. This kind of populism merges populist rhetoric
with authoritarian values, which prioritize three main components. The first component of
authoritarian values is the importance of security against instability or disorder. The second
component is the value of group conformity to preserve the established traditions and ways of
life of a culture. This component serves as an elevation of the group over the individual,
sacrificing higher levels of individualism and creativity for tradition and group conformity. The
third component is the need for loyal obedience toward strong leaders who protect the group and
its way of life (Norris, Inglehart, 2019). The second and less common major form of populism is
libertarian populism. It is similar to authoritarian populism in the sense that it also attacks
epicenters of power and targets corruption, conventional political parties, and international
corporations, but it deviates from its authoritarian counterpart in its acceptance of socially liberal
values and progressive social policies (Norris, Inglehart, 2019). This form of populism prioritizes
individualism as opposed to group conformity, and it is less focused on tradition and more
focused on social innovation and progress.

Donald Trump and the Republicans
Chapter two will focus on Donald Trump’s ascension to office in 2016, the inner
workings of the contemporary Republican Party, the recent failings of the Republican Party, his
brand of populism, and Trump’s failed 2020 campaign in which he lost to Joe Biden. Although
many might consider his ascension to the office of president in 2016 an unprecedented
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phenomenon that seemed the least likely of all possible scenarios in 2016, it is important to note
that the Republican Party’s behavior and policies in recent decades played an impactful role in
creating a situation where an outsider like Trump could effectively take control of the party
without any help from the inner establishment of the party.
Both the Reagan and Bush administrations didn’t heed warnings calling for protectionist
industrial policies that would help protect American workers and expand American
manufacturing in an increasingly competitive global market. Instead, they embraced a neoliberal
economic plan that fully embraced globalization and ultimately led to the decline of American
manufacturing, subsequently replacing it with a more service-based economy more reliant on
financial services (Judis, 2016). This series of economic policies have led to a precipitous decline
in employment within the industry, and this, alongside several trade agreements that proved to be
less than favorable for middle-class Americans, has led the standard of living for many
Americans to decline as a direct result of globalization (Houseman, 2018). The GOP
establishment’s support of increased American involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
conflicts abroad also proved to be unpopular amongst many voters, who rallied behind Trump
and his calls to “bring the troops back home.” The conglomeration of these policies alongside
others has pushed voters away from the usual options that operate within the established
Republican Party, and toward an alternative option in the form of Donald Trump.
Although Trump’s policies were obviously appealing to voters and allowed for his
success, the failures of the Republican party also greatly contributed to this phenomenon. The
high number of Republican candidates who were seeking the nomination in 2016 made it so that
Trump could win several primaries in important states with only 30% of the vote, which suggests
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that institutional and structural factors have an important impact on how and who gets elected in
the Republican primary. Regardless of the GOP establishment’s opposition to Trump, the large
number of candidates combined with the infighting amongst the Republicans in 2016 made it so
that the Republicans never ended up rallying behind one opposing candidate to combat Trump,
which subsequently led to his nomination and eventual ascension to office. Chapter two will
delve into greater detail regarding the Republican Party, its failings in recent years, and its
complicated relationship with Donald Trump and his policy platform.

Bernie Sanders and the Democrats
Chapter 3 provides information on Bernie Sanders’s campaign, his policy platform, his
brand of populism, and the Democrat Party’s relationship with this establishment outsider.
Although the Republican Party has demonstrated a considerable degree of infighting and
fragmentation in recent years, the Democratic Party, notwithstanding the fact that there isn’t full
consensus within the party, seems to be more unified, which has been exemplified in their
successful efforts to push away candidates such as Bernie Sanders from presidential elections.
Historically, the inverse seemed to be true. Republicans were seen as ideological purists that
would quickly disqualify any potential candidates if they didn’t check all of the necessary boxes,
and Democrats were more of a coalition group made up of several different factions with
different objectives, which led to infighting and disagreement within the party (Grossman,
Hopkins, 2015). This historical precedent must now undergo a reevaluation, as Democrat
coalitions have united effectively in recent years to pass large legislative packages, including
impactful policies such as the Affordable Care Act in 2009-2010 (Grossman, Hopkins, 2015).
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This reunification of the Democratic Party in recent years (not to say that there isn’t any conflict
within the party) after a historical precedent of infighting and ideological conflict has allowed for
the Democrats to do what the Republican Party failed at; to quickly halt the ascension of an
establishment outsider to the office of the presidency. Bernie Sanders campaigned
unapologetically as an outright, self-proclaimed socialist, which severely damaged his
electability in any general election in the eyes of the established Democrat Party. The rationale
behind this was that the voting constituency involved in the Democratic Primary was much more
liberal and left-leaning than the general population of American voters, meaning that Sanders
doing well in the primary was in no way an indication that he would do well in a general
election, especially considering the fact that the majority of Americans have a negative
impression of socialism (Pew Research). In this sense, Sanders’s language and rhetoric played an
integral role in the failure of his campaigns in 2016 in 2020. Sanders, like Trump, also had a
policy platform that operated outside of the interests of many of the powers that be in the
established faction of both parties. For example, Sanders strongly supported a troop withdrawal
out of the Middle East, which agitated people operating within the American military machine,
and thus ensured that powerful actors within that faction would not support him and instead
would actively attempt to handicap his campaign. Sanders was also very critical of PNTR with
China, globalization’s effects on the American middle class, the decline of American
manufacturing, and several other facets of the status quo consensus that has been arrived at by
both Democrats and Republicans. Sanders also supported increased taxes for wealthy Americans
and big corporations as well as campaign finance reform, which damaged the interests of many
established politicians who rely on the generous donations frequently given to them by large
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corporations. These policy proposals caused many people operating within the established
Democrat Party to paint a target on the back of Sanders, in order to preserve their interests and
uphold the status quo that is working very effectively for them, but not for millions of
Americans.
The institutional framework of the Democrat primary also played an integral role in
Sanders’s failures in both 2016 and 2020. The role that delegates and super-delegates play in the
primary is incredibly impactful on the outcome of the primary election, and Sanders knew this.
Although Sanders performed better than many of his counterparts in both primary
elections, his failure to capture certain voting constituencies crippled his campaigns in 2016 and
2020. In the 2016 primary election, Sanders performed exceptionally well amongst rural and
working-class whites, and his plan was to uphold this trend in 2020 while also capturing more
votes from non-white working-class people. However, establishment democrat Joe Biden’s
important win by an immense margin of about 29 percent of the vote exemplified one of
Sanders’s biggest problems; his failure to attract the black vote (Beauchamp,2020). Black
political identity in the United States is strongly tied to the Democratic Party institution, which
may have repelled them away from Bernie considering his position within the party as an
“outsider” and the large number of established democrats that disavowed his campaign and
labeled him a radical candidate (White, Laird, 2020). Chapter 3 will delve deeper into the
nuances of Sanders’s campaigns in 2016 and 2020, as well as his relationship with the
Democratic Party, the institutional mechanics of the Democrat primary, and the reasons why
they were able to stop “outsider” populist.
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Conclusion
The recent ascension of populist candidates to mainstream popularity in American
politics is an impactful phenomenon that has vast implications for the future of the American
political system. For decades, entrenched political party establishments have run the country with
little to no challenges from outside the status quo orthodoxy that has been deeply
institutionalized into the political system. Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are both populist
outsiders that challenge the standard factions that have assumed an almost monopolistic grip on
the governmental system. They offer many policy proposals and that run counter to the goals of
their respective political party establishments, and this is what has allowed both candidates to
garner an unprecedented amount of support. Their successes and failures have exemplified the
similarities and differences between the Republican and Democratic parties, and they have
shown that the messaging of populism is now able to capture a significant portion of American
voters. Populism’s recent ascension strikes at the root of American political institutions and their
legitimacy. As previously stated, populism makes two core claims. The first is that the epicenters
of power in any given country are operating outside of the public interest and that they are
corrupt and self-serving institutions that are upheld by the powerful. The second is that the only
legitimate source of power in any functioning democracy must come directly from the people.
Populism’s rise indicates a decline of public trust in the conventional political institutions that
run the country (including the established Democratic and Republican Parties), and this has
grave implications for the future. The subsequent study will analyze this resurgence of populism
in recent years, the ways populism manifests itself into different movements and candidates
(particularly in Trump and Sanders), the relationship between populist outsiders and established
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party orthodoxies, and the impactful consequences that these phenomena have on the political
institutions and systems of the United States of America.
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CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN POPULISM

Defining Populism
There are three major defining characteristics of a populist movement, candidate, party,
etc. The first two characteristics are the two core claims that populists make about the manner in
which societies should be governed. The first claim is that the established epicenters of power in
any given country are subject to corruption and can oftentimes operate in self-interest. Populists
commonly attribute blame to a variety of institutions such as the media, politicians, lobbyists,
political parties, intellectuals, etc. They commonly refer to these established epicenters of power
as ‘the establishment’. These are typically institutions that are grounded in traditional legitimacy
and that have withstood the test of time but have ultimately been co-opted by malicious actors
that seek to further their own personal agendas at the expense of the rest of society, commonly
referred to as ‘the people’. Donald Trump, for example, one institution that he relentlessly
attacks is the mainstream media, commonly levying accusations that the media is biased,
political, and unfair in their reporting of him and other Republicans. Bernie Sanders attacks
corporate lobbyists and the billionaire class. This claim being made by populists basically serves
as an outright attack on the legitimacy of these established institutions. Legitimacy can best be
understood as the capacity for a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing
political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for society (Lipset, 1959).
Legitimacy is what leads citizens to voluntarily follow the laws of their respective countries
rather than being coerced to do so under the fear of retribution or punishment. Given this
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definition, one can infer that a rise in populism can oftentimes correlate with a decline of public
trust in legitimate sources of political power.
The second claim is that the only legitimate source of authority in any functioning
democracy flows directly from ‘the people’ (Norris, Inglehart, 2019). This claim serves almost as
a prioritization of the voices of regular citizens over expert judgments, which happen to usually
come from established sources of power (‘the establishment’). This claim has manifested in
many populist movements, such as the rise of Trumpism, with anti-intellectualism. In this sense,
populist rhetoric tends to erode trust in the governmental systems and elected representatives of
liberal democracies, but it can also oftentimes dissuade people from trusting public intellectuals
and academia. This has been exemplified in Trump’s base and their distrust of public health
officials in the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as Sanders’s base and their distrust
of economists that disavow socialism.
The third and final main characteristic of populism is that it has no allegiance to any
particularly political ideology, and it instead is a political logic, or a way of thinking about
politics (Judis, 2016). This chameleon-like nature allows the messaging and central ideas of
populism to be adopted by a variety of different political movements from all ends of the
political spectrum, which has culminated in populist parties on the rightwing, leftwing, and
center. A functional definition of populism was eloquently purveyed in the book The Populist
Persuasion, where Michael Kazin defines populism as “a language whose speakers conceive of
ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class; view their elite opponents
as self-serving and undemocratic; and seek to mobilize the former against the latter” (Kazin,
2017).
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Varieties of Populism
Although populism’s rhetoric can be adopted by a range of varied candidates and movements
with vastly differing ideologies and political persuasions, there are a few major forms of
populism that differ from one another. The first is authoritarian populism. This kind of populism
merges populist rhetoric with authoritarian values, which can be organized into three main
components. The first component of authoritarian values is the importance of security against
instability or disorder. This can often culminate in a hostility to different cultures, traditions, and
peoples, which authoritarians tend to conflate with instability and disorder. The second
component is the value of group conformity to preserve the established traditions and ways of
life of a culture. This component serves as an elevation of the group over the individual,
sacrificing higher levels of individualism and creativity for tradition and group conformity. The
third component is the need for loyal obedience toward strong leaders who protect the group and
its way of life (Norris, Inglehart, 2019). This persuasion is what often leads people to support
candidates and politicians that erode their liberties while replacing them with promises of
security and safety.
Rightwing populists, who are similar to authoritarian populists but not synonymous, tend
to champion ‘the people’ against the epicenters of power commonly labeled ‘the elite’, but they
are different than leftwing populists in the sense that they often levy accusations that ‘the elite’ is
coddling a third group, known as an out group. Out groups tend to be immigrants, Islamists, or
any other faction that makes for a convenient scapegoat for many of society’s problems. This is
what makes rightwing populism triadic as opposed to leftwing populism, which is dyadic (Judis,
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2017). This is exemplified by Sanders’s pointed criticism of the billionaire class and Trump’s
criticism of the ‘swamp’ and their coddling of illegal immigrants. Trump, however, doesn’t limit
his ‘out’ group in an exclusionary way, and therefore he tends to set his sights on different
groups such as Islamic migrants whenever this might prove advantageous to him.
Another less common form of populism is libertarian populism. It is similar to
authoritarian populism in the sense that it also attacks epicenters of power and targets corruption,
conventional political parties, and international corporations. It also aims to elevates the voice
and power of ordinary people. However, it deviates from its authoritarian counterpart in its
acceptance of socially liberal values and progressive social policies (Norris, Inglehart, 2019).
This form of populism prioritizes individualism as opposed to group conformity, and it is less
focused on tradition and more focused on social innovation, the protection of individual rights
such as freedom of speech, and progress.

Populism’s Significance
More than anything, populism’s emergence represents a departure in satisfaction with the
status quo politics of the Republican and Democrat establishments. The recent successes of
Trump’s candidacy and Sanders’s impressive (albeit unsuccessful) performance in the
Democratic Primaries signal that the prevailing political ideology is flawed and doesn’t work,
therefore it needs correction (Judis, 2016). It’s important to note that although Donald Trump is a
rightwing figure in many ways, even his brand of populism represents a rebuke to the neoliberal
consensus and a departure from the traditional idea of free trade. This exemplifies just one
example of populism rebuking the standard way of doing things. Both Trump and Sanders have
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embraced the idea of protectionism and they both regularly cite the decline of American
manufacturing to justify their positions on protectionist trade policies such as tariffs. This
phenomenon is particularly salient because in the past, free trade was generally agreed upon by
the established political factions in America, although support of free trade was unsymmetrical
and skepticism most often came from the prominent democrats. Free trade had more support
from traditional power wielders within both parties of legislators, (although many democratic
legislators were vocal in their skepticism of neoliberalism) so this departure within large factions
in both political parties from free trade and towards protectionism represents a more general
departure from prevailing political norms that have been proposed, implemented, preserved, and
guarded by the elite leaders of society (Judis, 2016). This supposed distancing from elite interests
has been exemplified by both politicians on several fronts aside from their positions on free trade
such as their similar noninterventionist positions on America’s involvements in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In the past, there were plenty of populists that attempted to provide alternative
options to the policy platforms of the established and entrenched parties, but never has the
messaging of populism allowed candidates to receive the extent of attention and support of
people like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.

American Populism’s History
The Peoples Party
Populism’s inception within American politics came from an alliance between the Kansas
Farmers Alliance and the Knights of Labor in 1892. There were several impactful phenomena
that culminated in this alliance. At the time, a self-regulating market and laissez-faire economics
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was commonplace in America, and there was a broad consensus amongst both parties that
government’s role in regulating and guiding the economy should be minimized to the furthest
extent possible (Judis, 2016). In the same time span, however, farmers were struggling due to
large decreases in agricultural prices and predatory railroad companies (which acted as
monopolies) that increased the transportation costs of produce (McCarty, 2003). Data from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture shows that within just about three decades from 1870 to 1897,
wheat prices fell from $1.06 a bushel to 63¢ a bushel, corn from 43¢ to 30¢ a bushel, and cotton
from 15¢ a pound to 6¢ a pound. The following excerpt from a magazine titled The Progressive
Farmer from April 28th, 1887, accurately captures the attitudes of many agrarian communities in
this time.

“There is something radically wrong in our industrial system. There is a screw loose. The wheels
have dropped out of balance. The railroads have never been so prosperous, and yet agriculture
languishes. The banks have never done a better or more profitable business, and yet agriculture
languishes. Manufacturing enterprises never made more money or were in a more flourishing
condition, and yet agriculture languishes. Towns and cities flourish and ‘boom’ and grow and
‘boom,’ and yet agriculture languishes. Salaries and fees were never so temptingly high and
desirable, and yet agriculture languishes.”
The People’s Party represented a large coalition of farmers and blue-collar workers from
around the country that were increasingly dissatisfied with the systems in which they operated,
claiming that the government was controlled by the wealthy elites and that it was indeed a
“plutocracy”. In The People’s Party’s early days before their formal formation, the alliances that
would eventually become TPP advocated for mild reforms such as railroad regulation and
demands for recognition of labor unions, but there was never consensus amongst them that
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capitalism had to be abolished, only that some reforms were necessary (Johnson and Porter,
1977).
These alliances eventually called for more fringe and unpopular policy proposals such as
the nationalization of railroads and a graduated income tax, which caused the major political
parties to reject their populist demands (Johnson and Porter, 1977). This predictably led to
accusations being thrust from populists toward Democrats and Republicans that they were
corrupt actors controlled by the plutocracy and it created more distance between populists and
the mainstream political factions that ruled the country.
In 1892, the populists decided to run their own candidate, James K. Weaver, to run for
president. At a party convention within this timeframe, Ignatius Donnely created a preamble to
their populist platform with themes that would be replicated for decades to come in many other
populist movements. One quote from this preamble said, “We seek to restore the government of
the Republic to the hands of the ‘plain people,’ with whose class it originated.” The themes
Donnely purveyed in this statement weren’t uncommon but was uncommon was that he
(alongside the other populists) believed that to restore the government’s power into the hands of
the people, their needed to be more government intervention within the economy (Judis, 2016).
This rebuttal to the laissez-faire economic worldview that was so common at this point in
American history would provide the groundwork for populist movements for decades to come,
and it can be seen in contemporary candidate such as Sander’s disdain for capitalism or Trump’s
support of protectionism over the free-trade principles that typically dominate American politics.
The populists performed fairly well in the 1892 presidential election, with their candidate
earning about eight percent of the vote. The 1894 elections spelled the end for The People’s
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Party, however, as the major parties tactfully neutralized their populist opponents. Several
prominent Democrats and Republicans adopted populist platforms. The most notable was the
Democratic nominee, William Jennings Bryan, who coopted the populists by endorsing railroad
regulation and restrictions on foreign pauper labor. That election, the populists chose to endorse
Bryan rather than run their own candidate and this caused the populist vote to migrate toward the
major political parties in subsequent elections (Judis, 2016).

Huey Long
One of the most beloved populist figures amongst the endorsers of populism in all of
American politics is Huey Long. He structured himself from the get-go as a champion of the
downtrodden and he regularly attacked big business. He was elected governor of Louisiana in
1928 where he worked tirelessly for the poor populace by funding infrastructure (specifically the
roads), funding the schools and healthcare, and even exempting Louisiana’s poor from having to
pay taxes. Long even managed to enact an extraction tax on oil companies, which he had a
particularly contentious relationship with (Judis, 2016). This policy among others exemplified
Long’s adversarial relationship with big business, which is a staple in many populist movements.
On one occasion, Long even compared an oil company called Standard Oil Corporation to the
Klu Klux Klan (Leavitt, 2014). Rather than pursuing a political ruling class of elites like Trump
did with his “drain the swamp” messaging in his 2016 campaign, Long pursued an economic
elite in a similar fashion to Bernie Sanders.
Long endorsed many policies such as redistributionism, limits on family wealth, and
guaranteed annual income that presented a significant departure from the capitalist laissez-faire
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principles that dominated American politics in his time. Due to Long’s popularity and the
attention be brought to economic inequality, Roosevelt joined forces with Democrats and passed
the Social Security Act as well as progressive tax reforms that helped to mitigate the rampant
inequality mentioned by Long repeatedly. He was one of the first major figures in American
politics to begin to speak about economic inequality and the problems that it can create for the
country. Many populists ever since then have followed suit, with the most obvious example that
comes to mind being Bernie Sanders.

The Tea Party
A more recent and salient example of an influential populist movement is The Tea Party,
which was formed in response to the 2008 global financial crisis. This crisis didn’t happen in a
vacuum however, as many deep-rooted systemic problems that were created and upheld through
neoliberal policies eventually culminated in the financial crisis. Many Asian countries were
sending dollars back to the US that they acquired from trade surpluses. These dollars were then
exacerbating consumer debt, which was primarily being used for housing due to the housing
boom. The artificial demand in this housing boom was being sustained in an economy that might
have slowed otherwise. Eventually this led to the 2007 burst of the housing bubble, and this
culminated in millions of Americans losing their homes and many financial institutions
(particularly banks) being put at risk (Judis, 2016). This, of course, led to a bad recession. It’s
important to note, however, that what made much of this possible was the neoliberal consensus
that took place for decades prior (which included lax regulations, financial deregulation, etc.) as
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well as several trade policies that allowed Asian countries to have these large surpluses in the
first place. Crack downs on unionization coincided with these policies and it led many
Americans to challenge their preconceived notions about capitalism, regulation, and neoliberal
economics.
Although tensions had been rising long before Obama’s inauguration, the Obama
administration’s response to this crisis is what eventually culminated in the inception of the Tea
Party. After the crisis unfolded, in his inaugural address Obama attributed blame equally to
regular people as well as financial institutions such as Wall Street. Also, Obama’s DOJ didn’t
prosecute even one of the major players in the financial crisis. What seemed to infuriate voters
the most was that Obama’s administration prioritized bailing out enormous banks over helping
regular homeowners that had lost their homes during the burst of the housing market (Judis,
2016).
It seems CNBC commentator Rick Santelli’s attacks on Obama’s mortgage plan proved
to be the final catalyst that created the Tea Party. In response to the financial crisis, the Obama
administration quickly began pushing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (which
costed about $1 trillion) shortly after his inauguration. Santelli was already frustrated with the
Bush administration and its fiscal irresponsibility throughout their multi-billion-dollar bailouts
and spending packages, so this new bill being presented by Obama infuriated Santelli (Hawkins,
2019). While at the Chicago Stock Exchange, Santelli stated the following.
"The government is promoting bad behavior... This is America! How many of you people
want to pay for your neighbor's mortgage that has an extra bathroom and can't pay their bills?
Raise their hand."
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He then called for a “Chicago Tea Party” to protest the Obama administration’s economic
plan. His plea was answered and shortly after this clip began to disseminate throughout the
country, the first Tea Party protests took place in February in about 50 American cities, where
tens of thousands of protestors showed up to protests not only Obama’s policies, but Bush’s too.
Although the Tea Party wasn’t a single organized faction but rather many local groups
independent of each other, there were several unifying ideals that established a sense of cohesion
amongst the groups. The ‘Us versus Them’ theme commonly expressed in populist rhetoric was
exemplified by the Tea Party’s messaging regarding the “makers” and “takers” of America. They
loosely define the “makers” as the productive people that work and pay taxes and the “takers” as
freeloaders that live off entitlement programs funded by their productive counterparts. They
viewed the Affordable Care Act through this prism, as seniors on Medicare who paid the bulk of
the insurance would see their benefits decreased to pay for the program (Judis, 2016). All in all,
the Tea Party served as a repudiation of the status quo regarding federal budgets, financial
institutions, banking, economic inequality, and the fiscal irresponsibility exemplified by the Bush
and Obama administrations.

Occupy Wall Street
Another populist movement that happened within the same timeframe as the Tea Party
was Occupy Wall Street. In February 2011, a website called AmpedStatus.com published a
report on the US economy called “The Economic Elite vs. the People of the United States.” It’s
author, David DeGraw claimed in this report that the two major political parties have been
corrupted by a well-connected, rich group of elites. After the report was posted to the website,

22

the website was inexplicably taken off line until the hacker group called Anonymous created a
new website in which they joined with the AmpedStatus organizers to create a new movement
entitled A99 (Judis, 2016). This new effort quickly put out a call to action, encouraging
demonstrators to occupy a park near Wall Street. The demonstration didn’t end up being very
large or impactful, so the organizers partnered with a group called New York City General
Assembly that had previously been protesting city budgets. Then, an anti-capitalist publication
called Adbusters put out a call to action on its website for protestors to demonstrate on
September 17th at Zuccotti Park near Wall Street. That day, over a thousand protestors showed
up and about 300 camped there overnight (Judis, 2016). In the coming days, thousands more
came to demonstrate, and the movement diffused into hundreds of demonstrations all over the
country.
The main sentiment of the Occupy protestors was that they were dissatisfied and
infuriated by the neoliberal policies that enabled the rampant economic inequality that plagued
the nation. A slogan for the movement was posted on a new Occupy Wall Street website and it
read as follows.
“We are the 99 percent that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1
percent.”
The movement structured their core sentiments in populist terms by framing the 99
percent at ‘the people’ and the one percent as the ‘economic elite’. This vague expression of
discontent with the wealthy elite is what allowed the movement to garner so much expansive
support from all around the country, as many Americans were beginning to call attention to
economic inequality. This appeal to what can be called ‘open-source populism’ is not
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uncommon, as many populists movements throughout history have structured their concerns as a
struggle between regular people and a small wealthy elite (Lowndes, Warren, 2011). Occupy
Wall Street provided substantive proof that many Americans (perhaps a majority) were frustrated
and dissatisfied with the system in which they operated, which had been misguided by
neoliberalism for decades, and the resulting economic and political inequality.
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CHAPTER 2: DONALD TRUMP AND THE REPUBLICANS

Is Donald Trump a populist? If so, what kind?
Although Donald Trump may be categorized by his contemporaries as blatantly rightwing due to his flagrant and constant attacks on left-wing opponents and his identification as a
Republican, Trump’s policy positions defy neat and convenient categorization. Trump has been
in the public sphere for decades, but he only began to dabble in politics in the late 1980s, when
he ran a full-page ad in several newspapers including the New York Times regarding American
foreign policy decisions (Judis, 2016). In the late 1990s, he actively sought out the Reform Party
nomination, which was created by fellow populist, Ross Perot. Although many were interested in
a Trump 2000 campaign, he was ultimately unsuccessful and he conceded to his far-right
opponent, Pat Buchanan (who was also considered a populist by many), who he accused of being
a “Hitler lover” (Helmore, 2017). This offensive and insulting jab at his opponent would prove to
be a consistent strategy that Trump would later employ against countless other opponents.
Trump’s views throughout these two decades reflect the difficulty in neatly defining him
as strictly right-wing or conservative. In 1999, Trump said “I’m very pro-choice.” He also
wanted to protect Social Security and Medicare from cuts, he backed some form of universal
national health insurance, and he also supported infrastructure spending that was opposed by
many conservatives and Republicans (Judis, 2016). For his 2016 campaign, he had to change his
positions on several issues such as abortion considering the fact that a pro-life stance is necessary
to successfully run as a Republican. Trump’s malleability regarding several key positions such as
abortion illustrate one facet of populism that he accurately reflects, and that is the chameleon-
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like nature of populism that allows a variety of candidates from different political ideologies to
adopt its rhetoric and logic. He did, however, stand by his defense of Social Security, Medicare,
infrastructure spending, and he even flirted with the idea of replacing the Affordable Care Act
with some form of national health insurance. Many of Trump’s flagship policies (which are what
got him elected) served as a repudiation of neoliberal policies regarding trade deals, investment,
immigration, and foreign policy.
Regarding his stance on defense and foreign policy, Trump’s “America First” agenda
reflects the populist notion that elites acting in self-interest (often referred to as beneficiaries of
the military industrial complex) are the ones that want endless wars and overseas conflicts and
that the US should instead focus on the myriad of domestic problems that remain unaddressed
which reflect the wants and needs of ‘the people’. Trump has regularly argued that the United
States pays far more than it should on defense for foreign nations that are wealthy enough to
defend themselves (Judis, 2016). Trump is essentially a non-interventionalist, and his stance has
remained relatively untouched for decades. The following quote from a CNN townhall
encapsulates his overall position effectively.
“We’re paying too much! You have countries in NATO, I think it’s 28 countries – you
have countries in NATO that are getting a free ride and it’s unfair, it’s very unfair. The United
States cannot afford to be the policemen of the world anymore, folks. We have to rebuild our
own country. We have to stop with this stuff.”
Trump was very critical of Bush’s invasion of Iraq, and he continues to proclaim that the
United States regularly overextends itself abroad in a myriad of ways. All in all, Trump deviates
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from many mainstream Republicans in his opposition to various military involvements overseas
that he sees as unnecessary and costly.
Donald Trump’s positions on free trade also deviate from many of his conservative,
Republican colleagues. He has been very outspoken in his opposition to NAFTA and the
previous most-favored-nation trading status that was previously awarded to China before the
establishment of the World Trade Organization, claiming these deals had cost American jobs
(Judis, 2016). Trump was also highly critical of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as he
claimed it would accelerate the decline of manufacturing employment in the US, decrease
worker wages, and increase the trade deficit. Because of this, Trump withdrew from the deal in
his first day in office (McBride, Chatzky, Siripurapu, 2021). Trump’s major focus regarding
trade has been not only to reevaluate America’s former trade deals and their impacts on
American workers, but also to change the economic relationship between America and China,
which he sees as inherently exploitative due to differences in labor laws and variety of other
factors that allow China to mass-produce goods at a much cheaper rate. In fact, he has even
proposed several hefty tariffs on Chinese exports. In 2011, Trump told the Wall Street Journal
that a 25% tariff on Chinese goods would be necessary because they unfair trade advantages.
More recently in 2016, Trump flirted with the idea of a 45% tariff on Chinese goods (Fleury,
2016).
Donald Trump’s embrace of protectionist trade policies as opposed to the free-market,
neoliberal policies that were employed by his predecessors seems to reflect the populist notion
that ‘the people’ aren’t having their interests served by legislators, and that instead, a wealthy
political establishment is choosing to pass legislation that enriches themselves and their donors.
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In this sense, Trump frames his policies through a populist framework that is apparently catered
to regular American workers, or as he would describe them, “the people.”
Immigration is perhaps that most salient example of Trump’s right-wing, triadic
populism. Left-wing populism is instead dyadic, meaning it frames politics issues within a
vertical framework in which the middle and bottom of society ought to be arrayed against the
top, which they see as inherently exploitative to their less affluent contemporaries. Right-wing is
triadic, meaning this form of populism champions the people against an established elite, which
they accuse of coddling a third group, which in Trump’s case tends to be Mexican migrants most
often (Judis, 2017). He makes the claim that many other right-wing populists have made, which
is that a well-connected group of elites (oftentimes legislators) is coddling illegal immigrants in
order to serve their own self-interests at the cost of the American citizen and the American
worker. The following quote from his 2011 book effectively conveys his overall position on
illegal immigration.
“Illegal immigration is a wrecking ball aimed at U.S. taxpayers. Washington needs to get
tough and fight for ‘We the People,’ not for the special interests who want cheap labor and a
minority voting bloc.”
Trump’s framing of the illegal immigration issues is typical of a right-wing populist, as
he clearly established an ‘in-group’ (American citizens) and an ‘out-group’ (illegal migrants,
typically Mexican Americans). This ‘Us-versus-Them’ mentality is typical of authoritarian
populists, as it utilizes dormant feelings of xenophobia and racism to direct ire towards outgroups. In Trump’s case, the out-groups tend to be Muslim Americans and Mexican Americans.
Trump’s rhetoric regarding Mexican Americans has been referred by many as overtly

28

xenophobic and bigoted, as he regularly capitalizes on nativist sentiments within the population
to garner support. This was exemplified during one of Trump’s speeches in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania when Trump recited a poem called ‘The Snake’ to draw parallels between the
deceptive snake of the poem and illegal migrants and their behavior (CBS News, 2017). Trump’s
staunch opposition to illegal immigration was in part economic, as he frequently claims that it
depresses wages and increases competition among low-skill American workers, but it is also
cultural, as he also regularly makes the claim that illegal migrants increase crime and damage the
safety of American cities (Judis, 2017).
Regardless of a preponderance of research that shows that illegal immigrants have lower
crime rates than legal migrants and native citizens, Trump repeatedly makes this claim (Light,
He, Robey, 2020). This illustrates a broader distrust that many populists tend to have of expertise
in general. It also demonstrates Trump’s ability to construct a false reality or an alternate
dimension in which illegal migrants are stealing thousands of jobs from Americans and
committing crime at higher rates. He also said that his inaugural address had the highest
attendance in history, which is demonstrably false. This may seem like a harmless, boastful lie,
but it is part and parcel of a broader tendency that Trump has to bend the truth in order to serve
his ends. Using the false narratives that he spreads like wildfire through social media, Trump
effectively creates a different dimension for his voters where the only reasonable solution to the
problems he mentions (many of them disingenuous or misrepresented) are his policies. This has
contributed to an epistemological crisis in America where tens of millions of Americans can’t
tell what is and isn’t true, as misinformation continues to be peddled by politicians, social media,
news networks, and the president. The populist tendency to doubt expertise is nothing new, as
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many populists throughout American history have employed this strategy. What is new however,
is social media and its ability to amplify a message to the tune of hundreds of millions. Trump
has used this tool to bypass the conventional method past candidates and presidents used to
communicate with the American people; journalists and news networks. He regularly refers to
the American mainstream media as “the fake news media” and because of his perception of
American journalists as unfair ideologues that hate him, Trump has chosen to speak directly to
the American people through mediums such as Twitter, which allow him a considerable degree
of freedom (up until recently, that is). In the following quote, Trump illustrates social media’s
importance in his ascension to office, highlighting Twitter in particular (Barber, Sevastopulo,
Tett, 2017).
“Without the tweets, I wouldn’t be here . . . I have over 100m followers between
Facebook, Twitter [and] Instagram. Over 100m. I don’t have to go to the fake media.”
Donald Trump’s brand of populism can be accurately described as both right-wing and
authoritarian. In similar fashion to his populist predecessors in the People’s Party and their
xenophobic views of Chinese laborers, Trump’s triadic populism capitalizes on latent feelings of
xenophobia and nativism in order to categorize different demographics into ‘in-groups’ and ‘outgroups’ and to then galvanize an ‘us-versus-them’ narrative in which Americans are under
constant attack from Mexican migrants, Muslim migrants, globalist trade deals, global
competition, a corrupt ruling class, etc. He, like many other populists that came before him, is an
expert at utilizing the politics of fear to appeal to a strong voting bloc of reactionary
conservatives within the United States.
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Trump’s 2016 Campaign
In the leadup to the 2016 election, Donald Trump made many vague promises to voters
regarding a variety of different issues such as trade, immigration, national security, etc. Many
forces have allowed for his ascension to office in 2016, such as the institution of the electoral
college, the general disdain voters felt for both candidates in 2016, the Republicans’ failures in
their primary, and Trump’s many unattainable promises that appealed to a strong voting bloc of
reactionary conservatives.
Regarding his policy platform, Trump campaigned as a strong, right-wing figure who
aimed to restore America’s dignity on the global stage through a variety of different policies,
many of which were unattainable or at least unlikely to be fulfilled.
In typical right-wing, triadic populist fashion, Trump promised to crack down on illegal
immigration by building a large wall on the southern border and making Mexico pay for it. He
also promised to enact a ban on Muslim immigrants entering the country after a horrific shooting
in San Bernardino, California (Qiu, 2016). Both positions were in line with his brand of rightwing populism, as these two positions clearly categorized the ‘in group’ as American citizens
and the ‘out-group’ as Mexican and Muslim immigrants.
Trump did however, distance himself from many of his Republican colleagues in his
positions on free trade. He promised to bring back millions of manufacturing jobs by
withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and by re-negotiating NAFTA. He also
proclaimed that he would put hefty tariffs on goods from Mexico and China (Qiu, 2016). These
policies were aimed at insulating many industries within America from global competition,
which represents a departure from the neoliberal policies of the past few decades. The distance
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that he created between himself and much of the traditional Republican leadership culminated in
a conservative ‘Never Trump’ movement to be formed, but the dissatisfaction that Republican
voters felt toward the GOP leadership in recent years caused the movement to fizzle out and
become obscured by the overwhelming support Trump got.
Trump’s ambiguity and lack of precision in his policy platform may seem like a
hinderance or setback in some ways, but it can actually be quite the advantage. As mentioned
previously, Trump has demonstrated a considerable degree of malleability and imprecision in his
positions on some key topics, with abortion being the main issue he has completely changed his
position on to maximize his electability. This chameleon-like nature is common amongst
populist figures, as populism is a political logic that can be utilized in a right-wing, left-wing, or
centrist policy platform or worldview rather than a political ideology tethered to a particular end
of the political spectrum (Judis, 2017). A 2009 paper from political scientists at UC Berkley
found that voters tend to prefer ambiguity over precision in partisan elections, the reason being
because this allows voters to see what they want, in a way shielding themselves from the
uncomfortable complexity of nuanced issues (Tomz, Houweling, 2009). This ambiguity and the
preferences of voters for this lack of precision in policy positions is exactly what allows Trump
and his voters to weave together narratives out of whole cloth. This is, of course, not unique to
Trump as many politicians tend to manipulate the truth in order to frame themselves as the only
viable solution to the problems they mention that may or may not exist, but Trump’s usage of
this ‘alternate reality’ tactic is particularly potent considering the enthusiasm and loyalty of his
base and his ability to spread his rhetoric in a fast and incredibly expansive manner using social
media.
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One of the major factors that allowed for Trump’s eventual ascension to his presidency
was the complete and utter failure of the Republican party to settle the infighting and
fragmentation that plagued the 2016 Republican primary. Because of the incompetency of the
Republican party in 2016, there were an unusually large number of candidates competing for the
nomination, allowing Trump to win several states with only 30% of the vote or less. Once the
less popular candidates began to drop from the race, the Republican party couldn’t agree on one
candidate to consolidate their efforts behind due to purity tests and infighting about which
candidate would be suitable for the monumental task of beating Donald Trump, who was quickly
gaining traction amongst Republican voters. Basically, no one was suitable enough for the GOP
leadership to agree on, and because of this indecisiveness, Trump rose in popularity and
eventually won the nomination, effectively capitalizing on the impotence of the GOP and the
dissatisfaction Republican voters had with their party in recent years due to a myriad of factors
such as the decline in manufacturing employment, neoliberal trade policies that they believed
were harmful to American workers, overly lenient immigration policies, and other issues that
Trump claimed he could resolve.
Using the help of platforms like Twitter and support from prominent conservatives such
as Ann Coulter, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity, Donald Trump won the Republican
nomination by capitalizing on growing feelings of disillusionment with the way the country had
been run in recent decades (Cassidy, 2016). Using the dissatisfaction voters felt toward the
traditional leadership of the GOP and the help of these conservative pundits, Trump framed
himself as a right-wing populist cut from the same cloth as the Tea Party movement, which
effectively appealed to Republican voters and allowed for him to garner more support than any
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other Republican in 2016. Trump won the primary and eventually the presidency not by running
as a status quo Republican, but by distancing himself from the traditional GOP positions on
several important positions and by framing his message within the prism of populism, which
proved to be an incredibly popular and successful strategy.

Trump’s Presidency
When it comes to Trump’s campaign promises and his fulfillment of them, like all
presidents, he did some of the things he promised he would do such as banning travel from
several Muslim-majority countries where terroristic activity is prevalent and he failed to
accomplish some of his other promises, such as building a large wall on the southern border and
somehow making Mexico pay for it. In reality, the Trump administration oversaw about 452
miles of new border wall construction, however the vast majority of this replaced already
existing structures and Mexico did not, in fact, pay for the wall. Only about 80 miles of new wall
were built where there were no structures before (Giles, 2020).
The failure to complete all campaign promises is typical of any presidency, as political
gridlock is a constant obstacle for presidents in their pursuit of their policy agendas. One thing
that is particularly interesting, however, regarding Trump’s presidency is the fact that loyalty to
Trump amongst Republicans remained relatively consistent throughout his entire presidency,
including both impeachment trials and even after the capitol riot on January 6th, 2021.
A recent NBC News poll found that about 87% of Republicans approve of Trump’s
presidency, only about two percentage points lower than those who said the same before the
2020 election. Amongst Republicans who consider themselves more loyal to him than to the
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GOP, he touts a 98% approval rating, basically unmoved by his actions regarding the capitol riot.
For those who prioritize the GOP over Trump himself, his approval rating was still relatively
high at about 81% (Dann, 2021).
This high level of loyalty remained constant irrespective of Trump’s failures to deliver on
several campaign promises, his personal attacks on rivalrous politicians, or his rhetorical
contributions to the capitol riot, and it illustrates the incredible amount of enthusiasm and loyalty
amongst his political base. It seems that many Trump voters are willing to support their
candidate regardless of how many people he relentlessly insults, how many campaign promises
he breaks, or how damaging his rhetoric becomes to national discourse. This is indicative of a
broader trend in American politics, and that is a recent resurgence in authoritarian attitudes, thus
culminating in a strong preference among millions of voters for ‘strong leaders’ who are willing
to sidestep democratic norms in order to achieve policy goals. Recent national polling data from
the University of Massachusetts Amherst suggests that authoritarian values and fear of terrorism
can predict with statistical significance whether someone will support Trump (MacWilliams,
2016). It seems that authoritarian attitudes amongst voters are what hold the key to Trump’s
success and are what allow him to retain broad support amongst his base regardless of his
actions. Many Republicans have claimed that the loyalty that voters show Trump is not in spite
of the distance between him and status quo Republicans, but because of it. Some argue that his
messaging is more in line with the average, working class Republicans (which are more
plentiful) rather than the more affluent Republicans that are more likely to support free trade as
opposed to protectionism, are more open to immigration, and still support many of the trade
agreements that Trump relentlessly criticizes. The following quote from Republican
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Representative Patrick McHenry of North Carolina illustrates this point effectively (Martin,
Haberman, 2021).
“He has a complete connection with the average Republican voter and that’s given him
political power here. Trump has touched the nerve of my conservative base like no person in my
lifetime.”
Another notable hallmark of Trump’s presidency are the massive implications he has had
on the Republican party. Many political scientists have said that Trump’s impact on the
Republican party is akin to a hostile takeover, as he has successfully circumnavigated the ‘Never
Trump’ conservative movement and much of the Republican establishment to rise to power at
the behest of his voters against the status quo, neocon Republicans. Republicans now fear
defying Trump publicly, as this can quickly end whatever aspirations they may have for any sort
of future in Republican politics.
For example, Dave Trott, a two-term Republican congressman from Detroit criticized
Trump’s public behavior and his attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act in a closed-door
GOP meeting. He was quickly warned by colleagues that he should avoid doing so, as this is
akin to political suicide in the modern-day Republican Party. Ultimately, this culminated in Trott
deciding not to run for re-election (Martin, Haberman, 2021).
Another indicator of Trump’s tight grip on the Republican party was the House Inquiry
on Trump’s impeachment, which was built upon charges of abuse of power and obstruction of
justice regarding a phone call Trump had with the president of Ukraine. Not a single Republican
supported either article of impeachment, and in all of the trials regarding his dealings with
Ukraine, House Republicans defended him fervently while claiming that the entire impeachment
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was nothing but partisan theatre orchestrated by Democrats to attack Trump (Martin, Haberman,
2021). Even though some Republicans initially criticized Trump’s language in the infamous
phone call, they quickly walked back their comments after Trump began to defend himself
publicly.
Loyalty to Trump is incentivized not only through punishment, but also through very
advantageous rewards. Trump’s endorsements have boosted support for a myriad of candidates
and have helped elect many Republicans in districts all over the country. For example, Ron
DeSantis made many appearances praising Donald Trump on Fox News while he was
campaigning against Andrew Gillum for the 2018 Florida gubernatorial election. This caught the
eye of President Trump and ultimately culminated in an endorsement from Trump, which led to
DeSantis winning the election and assuming the office of Governor of Florida (Martin,
Haberman, 2021). In many ways, DeSantis echoes much of Trump’s populist rhetoric and his
ascension to the office of Governor illustrates the fact that populism is a winning strategy not
only on the national scale, but also in local elections all over the country.
All in all, Trump has effectively taken over the Republican party by connecting with
Republican voters in a way that the GOP leadership has failed to do in decades. He has distanced
himself from ‘establishment’ Republicans on many issues, and this has helped him captivate
voters in a unique way that few could have predicted. His hostile takeover of the Republican
Party has caused many up-and-coming Republicans to bow to him, as not doing so has become
political suicide, and doing so has proven to be lucrative and effective not just for Ron DeSantis,
but for many Republicans all over the country.
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Trump’s 2020 Campaign
It is no surprise that Trump’s presidency is seen by most Republicans as wildly
successful and by Democrats as a disaster that has damaged American credibility internationally,
as is exemplified by his approval ratings within the respective parties. Regardless of the general
public’s opinion of him, Trump unsurprisingly decided to run for re-election in 2020, which was
very much expected considering the high approval rating he boasted within the Republican party
and the unprecedented amount of loyalty Republicans have shown him throughout his
presidency.
Regarding Donald Trump’s policies that he ran on in the 2020 election, many of them
were relatively unchanged from his 2016 platform. Thus, his new slogan for his 2020 campaign
was ‘Keep America Great’, implying his presidency achieved his reactionary goal of bringing
America back to its vague former glory he has alluded to time and time again. His stances on
immigration that he ran on echoed many of the same sentiments as in 2016. Trump’s platform
included the goals of reducing illegal immigration, reforming the immigration system, and
continuing construction on the wall while once again using the right-wing populist language of
‘us-versus-them’ by claiming that illegal migrants drain social services, take jobs away from
Americans (the ‘us’), and bring crime with them into America (Bush, 2020). When it came
economic policies, Trump’s stance on the economy throughout his 2020 campaign was that the
country needs to return to its former economic glory before the disaster that was COVID-19, as
the pandemic crippled the economy. The route necessary to do so in his eyes was through tax
cuts and through ending trade deficits, which he saw is inherently harmful to the U.S. economy,
which is very much in line with his protectionist stances (Bush, 2020). Trump’s 2020 stances
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were basically the same as his 2016 stances, but he bolstered his stances using the successes of
his presidency.
Ultimately, Trump’s 2020 campaign ended in failure, largely due to Trump’s
inflammatory public behavior, COVID, the Trump administration’s mishandling of the crisis,
and its implications on the U.S. economy. Trump seems to have performed fairly well in the
2020 election if you only look at his numbers considering the fact that he earned about 10
million more votes in 2020 than he did in 2016, and he performed better with minority groups
than he did in 2016. Donald Trump got the second highest total amount of votes in American
history, with his competitor Joe Biden taking the top spot (Bryant, 2020). Although Donald
Trump did increase his total vote count by 10 million and earn more votes than any incumbent
president in American history, he was still beat by Joe Biden (a moderate Democrat who beat
Sanders in the Democrat primary), or perhaps more so by his own rhetoric and behavior.
Once election day came around, Trump initially thought that he had won on November
4th considering the fact that he had a lead in enough states to comfortably win the election and
mail-in ballots (which he discouraged his voters from using claiming they were more prone to
fraud) had not been counted. When he came to the harsh realization that Joe Biden had won the
election, Trump immediately began to stitch together a narrative in which the election was stolen
through fraud. This authoritarian behavior is typical of an authoritarian populist such as Trump,
as he has no moral qualms about eroding democratic norms in order to push unsubstantiated
misinformation. The president’s ability to not only create and disseminate a narrative, but also to
make his followers believe it is exemplified by a May, 2021 Reuters Poll. In this poll, 56% of
Republicans said that they believe that the 2020 election was a result of election fraud, illegal
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voting, or election rigging. About 6 of 10 Republicans agreed with the statement that “the 2020
election was stolen from Donald Trump” (Edwards-Levy, 2021). This conspiratorial tendency is
common in populist discourse and it is oftentimes characterized by a general distrust in
established institutions, in this case one of the most important institutions in America, the
American presidential election.
It seems that the boisterous, outspoken nature that proved to be an advantage for Trump
in 2016 also proved to be a disadvantage in 2020, as many voters didn’t necessarily vote for
Biden, but instead voted against Trump, settling for whoever had the Democratic nomination. In
an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll conducted one year before election day, almost half of all
registered voters had declared that they were going to vote for whoever the Democratic nominee
is to damage Trump’s chances of reelection. To be precise, 46% of voters in this poll said that
they are a “certain vote against Trump in 2020” (Chinni, 2019).
The downplaying of the COVID virus by President Trump and the mishandling of the
crisis, which led to negative economic implications also played a substantial role on his 2020
defeat. The crisis in and of itself wasn’t necessarily a signifier that Trump’s chances of reelection
were severely damaged, and crises can oftentimes bolster support for presidents depending on
their handling of the crisis in question. However, when information about the COVID virus
began to get more public attention at the beginning of the pandemic, Trump repeatedly
downplayed the severity of the virus and how serious the situation could become. He repeatedly
claimed that his administration had it “under control” and even said that the virus might
“disappear” almost like a “miracle” (Summers, 2020). In hindsight, the misrepresentation of the
pandemic is likely to have damaged his chances of reelection due to the hundreds of thousands of
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Americans who have now died from COVID and the severe economic implications that this had
on unemployment, GDP, the stock market, and other metrics by which we typically use to gage
the success of the American economy.
It seems that in an effort to retain his original base of voters, Donald Trump isolated
himself from the rest of the country (the majority in terms of raw numbers) by doubling down on
his inflammatory and offensive public behavior. Because many of his voters found this ‘say what
you think’ style desirable, Trump continued to personally attack members of the media, political
rivals, and anyone critical of him. This made it very easy for him to be demonized (as there is so
much subject material) as opposed to Joe Biden, whose moderate and generally calm nature
makes demonizing him more difficult. Although Trump increased his base of support by the tune
of about 10 million, his behavior throughout his presidency also substantially empowered an
opposing coalition of American voters to beat him in the ballot box.

Summary
Donald Trump’s classification as an authoritarian right-wing populist might have seemed
like a handicap in previous years, but discontent amongst Republican voters with the traditional
leadership of the GOP has led this voting constituency to seek alternatives, thus making the GOP
a party ripe for a hostile takeover. Trump capitalized on decades of voter dissatisfaction with
neoliberalism, illegal immigration, globalization, trade policies, foreign aid, outsourcing, the
overextension of the US military abroad, and the decline of manufacturing employment.
He did so by appealing to latent attitudes of xenophobia, nativism, and exclusionary
nationalism by employing the language of a typical triadic populist, pitting the American
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working class against a corrupt ruling class of elites (which he labeled “The Swamp”), claiming
they have been coddling a third group, in this case being illegal immigrants (more specifically,
Mexican illegals). By framing the country’s issues within this ‘Us versus Them’ paradigm,
Trump has used the politics of fear to craft a narrative in which the country is under attack from
every direction (both upwards via the establishment and downwards via illegal immigrants) and
the only viable path toward success or victory is his presidency. The combination of declining
trust in the GOP’s leadership (and the reign of neoliberalism it lead to) and Trump’s appeal to
latent feelings of nativism and authoritarianism amongst the American populace is what allowed
him to ascend to the presidency.
Once Trump arrived at the Oval Office, he continued to force the Republican party into
bending the knee to him, thus converting the GOP into the party of Trump. Anyone who dared to
oppose Trump during his tenure risked losing any potential future in Republican politics. Anyone
who publicly supported him with enthusiasm, such as Ron DeSantis, was met with advantageous
rewards, such as explicit endorsements from the president, or positive tweets or social media
statements that acted as soft endorsements in a way, helping to boost exposure and support for
up-and-comers within the ranks of the Republican party. He successfully captivated the
Republican voting bloc in a way that previous candidates amongst the party’s status quo
leadership couldn’t, and this led to Trump having one of the most supportive and enthusiastic
voting constituencies in recent memory. However, his behavior during his tenure pushed many
potential Trump voters in 2020 away, as many found his constant personal attacks and lack of
professionalism to be very repellant. This, alongside many of his policies and his handling of the
COVID-19 pandemic led Trump to lose the 2020 election, even though he gained 10 million
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votes from 2016 and he got more votes than any incumbent president in American history.
Trump’s flamboyant and explosive behavior, which seemed to be one of his biggest strengths
according to his voters, also proved to be one of his biggest weaknesses in his pursuit of new
voters. Although Trump continues to deny the legitimacy of the 2020 election, he has continued
to publicly flirt with the idea of running again in 2024. Trump’s ascension to presidency has
proven to be one of the most salient issues in recent history. He has proven that populism’s
viability was previously underestimated, or at least his strand of right-wing, authoritarian
populism. Although he is no longer president, Trump remains one of the most influential
political figures in contemporary American politics, and every indication seems to point towards
the possibility that Trump will once again run for president. If so, the implications could be felt
for decades to come.
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CHAPTER 3: BERNIE SANDERS AND THE DEMOCRATS

Is Bernie Sanders a Populist? If so, what kind?
Bernie Sanders is, of course, a very different political figure than Donald Trump in a
myriad of ways. To most, the most blaring example of their differences is the distance between
both candidates’ position on capitalism, taxes, and free trade more broadly. Although there is
more overlap than one might think regarding their economic policy proposals as both have
embraced protectionism to a certain extent (which will be examined later), Donald Trump’s
framing of himself as a fierce capitalist and Bernie Sanders’s self-identification as a ‘socialist’ is
exemplary of the vast ocean of distance between the two on the economy. However, the usage of
populist rhetoric by both politicians is incredibly salient as it portends to this thesis, and it
exemplifies the wide chasm of differences between the two. Their distinguished styles of
populism and the rhetoric they employ to advance their respective causes provides a useful
framework from which to differentiate and compare the two politicians.
Sanders describes himself as a ‘socialist’ and he has been an unmistakable progressive
for his entire political career. Although many politicians tend to engage in a form of
demagoguery in which they sculpt their malleable positions and values (or lack thereof) to
properly reflect the whims of ever-changing public opinion, Sanders breaks from that mold.
Throughout his political career, Sanders has made his focus the American economy, the income
inequality that exists within it, and the plight of the American worker. However, the studies,
statistics, and numbers he cites have changed throughout his decades in American politics, his
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prevailing message has not. The concentration of wealth in America amongst the upper strata of
income earners is something that Sanders has repeatedly mentioned throughout the years, as
exemplified in the following quote from a 1976 Vermont gubernatorial debate (Keith, 2015).
“The fundamental issue facing us in the state is that ½ of 1 percent of these people — the
richest ½ of 1 percent — earn as much as the bottom 27 percent and the top 3 percent earn as
much as the bottom 40 percent.”
He once again called attention to this same problem about fifteen years later in a C-SPAN
interview using different statistics, but his messaging remained unchanged (Keith, 2015).
“What we have seen in the last 10 years is the richest 1 percent of the population have
seen an 86 percent increase in their real income, OK? The richest people are becoming much
richer. Meanwhile the working class, the middle class, are becoming poorer.”
Although certain trends in income distribution tend to change throughout time in
America, as they do in any country, Sanders has repeatedly brought attention to the issue of
income inequality in the American economy because it doesn’t seem to be getting any ‘better’ in
his eyes. The statistics he has repeatedly cited throughout his political career seem to indicate
that the distribution of income is becoming increasingly centralized into the hands of a wealthy
few. In a recent Pew Research Center study on wealth and income inequality in America,
researchers found that income inequality in the U.S. has risen since 1980, and in comparison, to
similar, generally affluent countries such as the UK and France, the U.S. has a much higher rate
of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a common unit
of measurement used to measure income inequality on a scale of zero to one. In 2017, the U.S.
stood at 0.434 while the UK had a 0.392 and France had a 0.326 (Horowitz, Igielnik, Kochhar,
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2020). This issue of income inequality and the government’s failure to properly address it in
Sanders’s eyes is where his populism operates most commonly and most effectively.
Bernie Sanders, like any populist, divides America into two groups with interests that are
at odds with each other. These two groups are commonly referred to in populist discourse as ‘the
people’ and ‘the elite’ or ‘the establishment’. However, Sanders differs from Trump in his
classifications of who belongs to which group. His major focus throughout his political career
has been income inequality, thus his perception of who exists within ‘the establishment’ is the
billionaire class. In other words, Sanders considers ‘the people’ to be the 99 percent and he
considers the ‘establishment’ to be the one percent. He has repeatedly employed this framework
to describe America’s problem, regularly regarding the bulk of the nation’s struggles as a
struggle between the rich, well connected billionaire class that influences policy through
campaign donations and hoards wealth and opportunity and the poor and middle-class Americans
who struggle to make ends mee. This utilization of class-based conflict is common amongst selfproclaimed socialists, and it also fits the mold of populism in the sense that it creates a simple
dichotomy between two groups (the people and the elite) locked into a contentious battle of
opposing interests.
Sanders has employed populist rhetoric throughout his career on various occasions, as
exemplified by the following quote from his Facebook page (Bennet, 2020).
“Now is the time to have the guts to take on the corporate and financial elite of this
country that controls so much of our economy and our government.”
Within that quote was the obvious implication that power (in regards economic and
political power) is unfairly concentrated in the hands of a small number of people, which he
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labels ‘the corporate and financial elite’. This is a direct critique of the legitimacy of the
government, as he is accusing government officials of catering their legislative decisions toward
a rich faction of elites while neglecting the American people. The following quote is another
statement made on Sanders’s Facebook page.
“What we have done tonight in New Hampshire is nothing short of the beginning of a
political revolution. Let's win this primary. Let's defeat Donald Trump. And then let us begin the
work of transforming this country when we are in the White House.”
Here, Sanders suggests that a revolution of sorts must take place for true political and
economic power to be restored into the hands of ‘the people’. He frames his political movement
as a righteous fight for the American middle class from the greedy, corporatist elites existing
inside and outside of Washington. Sanders’s usage of the word “revolution” in this instance
seems to be rhetorical rather than literal, yet this sort of discourse still serves as a critique of the
prevailing norms regarding the pursuit of power in the U.S., thus suggesting that an
overwhelming surge of support is necessary for political victory. His usage of the word ‘we’ also
positions himself as a member of the people, therefore distancing himself from the wealthy elites
that draw most of his ire.
Regarding Sanders’s policies, many are, of course, left-wing in political orientation
which is unsurprising as Sanders does describe himself as a ‘democratic socialist’. However, he
is leftward of many of the status quo positions held by the Democratic part, generally. For
example, his official website shows that Sanders is a strong proponent of Medicare for all,
increased taxes (on the rich in particular), the Green New Deal, housing for all, free childcare
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and pre-K for all, etc. He also shares a lot of Trump’s views on trade treaties and foreign
investments, as exemplified by the following quote (Judis, 2016).
“My understanding, talking to many economists, is that NAFTA, PNTR [permanent
normal trade relations] with China, other trade agreements have cost this country millions of
jobs. I don’t think it is appropriate for trade policies to say that you can move to a country where
wages are abysmal, where there are no environmental regulations, where workers can’t form
unions.”
His distance from the rest of the Democratic party on his more progressive policy
positions as well as his condemnation of neoliberalism put him at odds with many of the party’s
more established, entrenched members. Sanders’s position as an outsider within the Democrat
party has allowed him and his base to frame parts of the Democratic establishment as part of the
‘corporate and financial elite’. Therefore, Sanders has framed his political career as a fight for
the American working class in which he has to actively combat the interests of a small group of
established elites with access to a disproportionate amount of economic and political power.
The populist discourse that Sanders employs as well as his position as an outsider within
the Democratic party indicate that Sanders is, in fact, a populist given the conventional definition
of the term. His populism, however, is much different than Trump’s authoritarian, right-wing
populism. Sanders is a leftist, as mentioned previously, and he avoids much of Trump’s nativist
rhetoric. Rather than identifying illegal immigrants or Muslims as ‘out-groups’, Sanders
identifies the corporate elite. His form of populism is more inclusive, encapsulating the entire
American working class as well as anyone who believes in the general notion that the corporate
elite possess a disproportionate amount of power. Therefore, Sanders’s populism can accurately
be defined as a form of left-wing populism wherein his ‘in-group’ encapsulates poor and
working-class Americans, and his ‘out-group’ includes the corporate/economic elite. This group
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of economic elites also includes government officials that he claims legislate on their behalf.
Also, his in-group doesn’t just include poor and working-class Americans, as anyone supporting
his policy agenda, including wealthy Americans, can be included within his in-group, but less
affluent Americans are Sanders’s major focus as he claims their interests are damaged most by
the wealthy elite and their subversion of government.

Sanders’s 2016 Campaign
Bernie Sanders ran for president in 2016 on the same policy platform that he has pushed
for throughout his entire political career, socialism. According to his own rhetoric, his definition
of socialism (or at least his public perception of it in his advocacy) seems to be malleable as it
has changed form throughout the years. In past years, Sanders has publicly praised aspects of
several leftist, socialist regimes such as Fidel Castro’s Cuba, Daniel Ortega’s Nicaragua, and the
USSR (Krieg, Kaczynski, Steck, 2020). Although he has given these regimes praise regarding
certain programs they employed, such as Cuba’s literacy program, Sanders has also called
attention to the human rights abuses perpetrated by these regimes. Regardless of this, Sanders
has undoubtably and enthusiastically praised brutal, despotic regimes and this has damaged his
electability amongst the general populace. In 2016, he distanced himself from these violent
regimes and ran on a form of democratic socialism that he and his supporters frequently
compared to the successful social democracies within the Scandinavian countries such as
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, etc. Although these countries utilize market economies and some
even offer more market protections than even the U.S., Sanders and his supporters still regularly
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label these countries ‘socialist’ and this has caused socialism’s perception amongst the American
populace to change.
This rebranding was necessary, as comparisons to the USSR’s socialism or Cuba’s
socialism don’t exactly provide for the most seductive policy platform, and vast swaths of the
American public still has a generally negative perception of traditional socialism, although this
has been changing in recent years, presumably in large part due to Sanders’s movement. A 2019
Pew Research poll found that overall, Americans have a much more positive perception of
capitalism (65%) than they do of socialism (42%) (Hartig, 2019). Just about a decade earlier in
another Pew Research poll, only about 29% of the populace expressed positive views of
socialism, demonstrating a notable increase in positive public perceptions of socialism in just a
decade.
Sanders’s 2016 campaign was targeted toward the billionaire class (his out-group) as he
advocated for higher taxes on the upper strata of income earners, which he saw as necessary so
that he could pass several policies aimed at helping working class Americans (his in-group), such
as a national $15 an hour minimum wage, free public college, and universalized healthcare.
When Sanders originally announced his bid for presidency in April 2015, few thought that his
candidacy would amount to anything, as he wasn’t even a Democrat at the time (Detrow, 2020).
After a few months, Sanders’s chances of winning the Democratic primary grew exponentially,
as his large rallies full of enthusiastic, young voters began to draw crowds of thousands of
people. Then, in 2016 Sanders shockingly tied Hillary Clinton in Iowa and then beat her by about
22 percentage points in New Hampshire (Detrow, 2020). He beat Clinton in a few other states,
but her delegate lead continued to grow as the months went on, and she won several key southern
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states with large black populations, which are essential to win any Democratic primary.
Ultimately, Sanders’s failure to capture the black vote culminated in him conceding the race to
Hillary Clinton shortly before the Democratic National Convention.
As previously stated, the biggest factor that led Sanders to lose the nomination in 2016
was the preference amongst black Americans for Hillary Clinton. Exit polls showed that amongst
white voters, Sanders basically tied Clinton. When it came to African Americans, however,
Clinton boasted a 50-percentage point advantage, exemplifying black Americans’ attachment to
their party and their aversion to outsiders like Bernie Sanders (Zitner, Chinni, McGill, 2016).
Clinton also greatly outperformed Sanders when it came to Democrats, which is obviously very
important in a Democratic primary, beating him by almost 30 percentage points. Sanders did
better with independents, but they only made up about 25% of the vote. Although Sanders
performed exceptionally among voters under 30 years of age (winning about 70% of those
votes), Clinton outperformed him with seniors, which represent a larger group of voters.
Younger voting cohorts are certainly very important, as they represent the future of the country,
but older voters tend to have higher turnout. Another advantage Clinton enjoyed in the primary
was the fact that she was perceived as a much more moderate candidate, and moderate voters
greatly skewed towards Clinton. She tied Sanders when it came to voters who considered
themselves “very liberal”, but Clinton won by large margins with voters who considered
themselves “somewhat liberal” or “moderate” (Zitner, Chinni, McGill, 2016).
After Sanders’s defeat at the hands of Hillary Clinton, many progressive supporters of
Sanders were quick to administer blame onto the Democratic National Committee due to leaked
emails published on WikiLeaks that revealed that several DNC staffers demonstrated an obvious
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preference for Clinton over Sanders, likely because his identification as a socialist damaged his
chances of beating Donald Trump in a general election (Detrow, 2020). Sanders supporters also
pointed to the structure of the Democratic primary and the supposed unfairness of the
superdelegate system. Although it is possible that this system could potentially be abused if the
right conditions were in place, this did not happen in the case of the 2016 primary, as
exemplified by the votes. The preference for Clinton wasn’t only held by DNC operatives or
superdelegates, but by vast swaths of the country. Clinton won the biggest states, such as Texas,
Florida, New York, and California and in terms of total votes, she outperformed Sanders by
about 3.7 million votes (Zitner, Chinni, McGill, 2016).
The conspiratorial nature of Sanders’s progressive supporters’ claims that the nomination
was stolen from Sanders by the Democratic establishment is exemplary of a broader trend in
populist discourse. The common populist skepticism of established epicenters of power extends
not only to the billionaire class in Sanders’s case, but also to the established political parties and
their respective leaders. This can culminate in anti-intellectualism (as in the case of right-wing
populists’ rejection of climate change), but it can also erode democratic norms and institutions,
such as faith in elections. This was most obviously exemplified when Trump denied the efficacy
of the 2020 election, as was discussed in chapter two. In the case of the 2016 Democratic
Primary, faith in the election process for the Democratic nomination was eroded by Sanders’s
supporters, but on a smaller scale and a much different way than that of the 2020 general
election. There is an important distinction to be made between these two phenomena. Trump’s
rejection of the 2020 election results acted as a direct subversion of democracy, simply because
he didn’t like the result. When Sanders’s supporters critiqued the efficacy of the primary after his
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loss, the general consensus among his progressive supporters was that the Democratic Primary
needed to be democratized further due to their perceived unfairness regarding some of the
mechanics of the primary such as the role of superdelegates. In this sense, Trump’s attack on the
2020 election served as an attack on democracy (in line with his right-wing authoritarian
populism) and the critiques that came from Sanders’s supporters didn’t seek to subvert
democracy but instead to further democratize the primary in order to make it more fair in their
eyes.
Anyhow, Sanders’s position as a socialist outsider within the Democratic party may have
boosted support amongst progressive voters, young people, and independents around the country,
but it also cost him the black vote, which is essential in a Democratic primary.
Sanders’s support (like Trump’s) demonstrated how much the neoliberal consensus and
the great recession radicalized large swaths of the voting population. Vast numbers of American
voters were pushed further right or left after these two phenomena, leading them to turn away
from more bipartisan, moderate candidates and toward more fringe candidates like Trump and
Sanders. Of all the voting constituencies, Sanders’s voters were demonstrably the most critical of
the economic system in America (Judis, 2016). In a Pew poll, 91% of his voters agreed with the
statement that the “U.S. system unfairly favors the powerful”. This voting group’s pessimism on
the American economy was also exemplified by a Pew survey that showed that 57% of his voters
believed that hard work was no guarantee of success” (Judis, 2016). This is no surprise
considering Sanders’s identification as a socialist, which serves as a direct repudiation of the
U.S. economic system and the supposed unfair advantages it awards the ‘economic elite’.
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Although the perception of socialism has begun to improve in recent years amongst
Americans, its political viability has yet to be proven on the national stage and running as a selfproclaimed socialist most certainly damages almost any candidacy. This also isolated Sanders
from moderate voters and Democrats who still had a considerable degree of faith in their party.
In similar fashion to Trump’s loss in 2020, it seems one of Sanders’s biggest strengths may also
have played a significant role in his downfall in 2016.

Sanders’s 2020 Campaign
In terms of his policy positions, Sanders’s 2020 campaign was basically no different than
his 2016 campaign. The issue of economic inequality remained paramount to him and his voting
constituency, and he continued to frame the problems of the country as a righteous battle
between the interests of the greedy economic elite and the American working class. The Sanders
campaign basically re-employed the losing strategy that lost him the 2016 primary in hopes that
four years of a Trump presidency would push enough moderate Democrats leftward enough to
vote for Sanders, a populist, socialist, party outsider. However, Sanders actually performed much
worse than he did in 2016, likely because voters feared he wouldn’t be able to beat Trump in a
general election while running on a ‘socialism’. Sanders’s performance worsened in 2020 by
wide margins in the first four caucuses and primaries. This trend continued into the Super
Tuesday where he worsened his numbers from 2016 by an average of 19.4% (Hudak, 2020).
A common defense of Sanders that emerged from his supporters when he
underperformed was that the crowd of candidates was much more crowded than it was in 2016,
thus making it a race between multiple candidates rather than a two-person race like in 2016.
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However, in Vermont (Sanders’s home state), Sanders barely managed to grab a majority
(50.6%) in 2020, dropping about 35 points from his total in 2016. Also, Sanders continued to
underperform after Elizabeth Warren (his biggest progressive competitor) dropped from the race,
thus making it once again a two-person race between him and Joe Biden, his moderate
competitor. There were nine primaries after Warren dropped from the race, and Sanders
underperformed by an average of 16%, losing three states he had previously won in 2016
(Hudak, 2020). Ultimately, Sanders performed much worse in 2020 than he did in 2016, and
there are a few major reasons why.
Firstly, Hillary Clinton wasn’t necessarily the most appealing candidate for Democratic
voters in 2016. After the 2016 election in a USA Today/Suffolk University poll, 62% of
Democrats and Independents surveyed said that she shouldn’t run in 2020, with only 23% of
voters surveyed saying they would be excited by her campaign (McCaskill, 2016). For many
reasons, such as her record as former Secretary of State, allegations regarding her time as
Secretary of State, her policies, etc., voters weren’t particularly fond of Clinton, meaning it is
very possible that Sanders was looked at by many as nothing more than a Clinton alternative.
This means that it is very possible that a considerable amount of Sanders’s voters in 2016 were
reluctantly choosing him because he was the only Clinton alternative rather voting for him based
off deep convictions tethering them to his policies.
Sanders’s campaign did make some changes from 2016 to 2020 to obtain the black vote,
which was essential for him to even come close to obtaining the Democratic nomination. He
hired a more diverse staff, attended several events at historically black colleges (HBCUs), and
spoke to black members of the media more often (Harris, 2020). Regardless of his efforts,
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however, Sanders did as badly with the African American community as he did in 2016. Rather
than voting for Sanders, black voters flocked to their party’s standard bearer in the 2020 election,
Joe Biden. After South Carolina Representative Jim Clyburn, who’s arguably the most influential
African American in congress, endorsed Joe Biden ahead of the pivotal South Carolina primary,
Biden went on to outperform Sanders by a wide margin and win the primary (Enten, 2020).
African Americans are not only Democrats, but strong Democrats. This demographic has voted
in an almost monolithic manner for decades, as no Republican presidential candidate has
received more than 13% of the black vote ever since 1968 and surveys show that upwards of
80% of African Americans identify as Democrats (White, Laird, 2020). This may be why the
black voting bloc is more resistant than other groups to party outsiders such as Sanders, as they
have been steadfast democrats for about half a century. African Americans are also surprisingly a
very conservative voting bloc, as exemplified by political scientist Tasha Philpot’s book titled
“Conservative but Not Republican” (White, Laird, 2020). This makes African American voters
not only more resistant to party outsiders, but even more resistant to outsiders like Sanders that
come from the left. There is a myriad of reasons why black voters are such steadfast Democrats,
many of them rooted in a long and complicated history that black Americas has had with party
politics, but the fact of the matter is that black Americans are very strong Democrats and this
damages Sanders’s chances of capturing their votes as a leftist outsider within the Democratic
party, regardless of how many black universities he speaks at.
Sanders’s position as an outsider may potentially strengthen the bond between him and
his young, socialist, progressive base, but it also caused him to receive very few endorsements in
2020, as he did in 2016. Operating outside of the Democratic establishment, which is almost
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inevitable when you label yourself a socialist, caused Sanders to only receive nine endorsements
in 2016 and ten in 2020 (Enten, 2020). There were a few other factors that led to Sanders’s 2020
loss, such as the absent ‘youth turnout surge’ that he had hoped for, but his radicalism, socialism,
and failures to obtain the black vote are ultimately what led to his concessions in 2016 and 2020.

Summary
A few decades ago, Bernie Sanders’s brand of socialist populism may have seemed to be
an incredibly fringe set of beliefs held only by small pockets of the country, but in the 2016 and
2020 elections, he proved that one can organize and empower an expansive and powerful
political movement by employing the populist discourse that Sanders utilized so effectively.
Dissatisfaction amongst both Republican and Democrat voters with the prevailing policies of the
past few decades has led voters to lose faith in the traditional power-wielders within both parties,
thus leading them to turn to populist outsiders that share their ire with ‘the establishment’ or ‘the
elite’ such as Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. Voters seem to increasingly feel like their
interests aren’t shared by the traditional leadership within the GOP of the Democrat party. This
willingness of voters to turn away from their parties and toward outsiders is a potentially
dangerous phenomenon, as it is leading to more fringe candidates amassing support and power.
This trend could become very ugly if unchecked, as history has demonstrated. However,
Sanders’s failed campaigns in 2016 and 2020 seem to indicate that there might be different levels
of dissatisfaction amongst Republican voters and Democrat voters. Perhaps Sanders’s failures
are indicative of a Democratic establishment that is simply more entrenched, unified, and
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powerful than the Republican establishment. These notions will be expanded upon further in the
conclusionary chapter.
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CONCLUSION

Trump and Republicans
Donald Trump won the 2016 Republican nomination and subsequently won the 2016
presidential race as a political outsider who connected with voters in a way that the GOP
leadership hadn’t in years. His victory acted effectively as a hostile takeover of the Republican
Party, as exemplified by the GOP’s total capitulation to him (with a few exceptions) after he took
office and up until the date in which this is being written. Unlike most past administrations, both
Republican and Democratic, Trump forced complete and utter loyalty, rewarding those who
followed him with endorsements and positive social media posts and punishing those who
publicly indicted him on his many mistakes (such as his public behavior, generally) by
disavowing their candidacies and disparaging them publicly. He capitalized on latent attitudes
among vast swaths of the populace of authoritarianism, xenophobia, nativism, exclusionary
nationalism, and racism to launch himself into the Oval Office. Not only did Trump effectively
weaponize regressive beliefs that still act as salient political tools, but he also effectively utilized
a general feeling of dissatisfaction amongst voters (Republican voters more so than Democrats)
regarding the prevailing policies of the past few decades. Many voters became disenchanted with
neoliberalism, some of the major trade deals passed in the last few decades, outsourcing, nonessential and costly foreign wars, and the resulting economic crisis caused by these phenomena.
Data highlighting historical trends regarding the Republican and Democrat parties from
Gallup suggests that voter satisfaction with both political parties has decreased in the last few
decades. From 1992 to 2020, the percentage of voters who expressed favorable views of the
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Democrat Party dropped from 54% in 1992 to 43% in 2020 while Republicans dropped from
53% in 1992 to 40% in 2020 (Gallup, 2020). This suggests that there has been a general decline
amongst American voters regarding their satisfaction and faith in both political parties, making
alternative options such as Donald Trump a more viable option regardless of his rambunctious
behavior and lack of political experience. What is also interesting about this data is that the
decrease in favorable views of Republicans is about a thirteen-point difference while the decease
for Democrats is about eleven points, which suggests that although skepticism of both parties has
increased, the negative perception of the Republican Party is stronger than that of Democrats,
which could be why the party was so ripe for the seizure of Donald Trump.
Pew Research published a 2015 study in late August that demonstrates a steady decline in
the American public’s perception of both political parties. In 2008, 12% of those surveyed
expressed unfavorable views of both parties. In 2004, 10% did so and in 2000, only 7% of those
surveyed expressed negative views of both political parties (Smith, 2015).
What seems most salient to the topic of populism and Trump’s ascension to office in
2016, however, is that this increase in negative views of both parties is largely concentrated
among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, who have become increasingly
frustrated with the Republican Party (Smith, 2015). What’s incredibly fascinating about this is
that the percentage of Republicans who viewed the GOP unfavorably in 2015 had more than
doubled from 12% to 27% from January to late August in a span of only about eight months.
Regarding voters who are on the fence, meaning independents that lean toward either party, 66%
of Democratic leaners viewed the Democratic Party favorably, while just 27% didn’t. Voters
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leaning Republican, however, were far more critical of the GOP with 44% who said they have a
favorable view of the Republican Party, while 50% view the party negatively (Smith, 2015).
In many ways, Donald Trump’s ascension to the Oval Office in 2016 serves as a populist
repudiation of the GOP’s policies and behavior in the last few decades, as exemplified by the
data compiled by Gallup and the Pew Research Center mentioned above. Republican voters have
become frustrated with their party, and Donald Trump’s candidacy provided them with the
perfect attack vector from which to punish the GOP leadership, as Trump’s position as an
outsider provided a compelling alternative for millions of unsatisfied Republican and Republican
leaning voters. In many ways, Trump’s candidacy and policy platform served as an indictment of
the GOP leadership on a variety of topics. For example, Trump’s embrace of protectionist trade
policies served as a critique of the GOP’s decisions regarding neoliberalism and trade deals and
Trump’s discourse regarding the need for troop withdrawals from the middle east served as a
critique of the GOP’s decisions to overextend America’s military duties abroad while neglecting
domestic problems. In many ways, Trump’s presidency was a problem, but it seems more so that
Trump was a symptom of broader, more widespread problems such as latent regressive attitudes
amongst the American populace and ineffective leadership and its consequences on the
American people.

Sanders and Democrats
As the data from Gallup and the Pew Research Center suggest, dissatisfaction with both
political parties has risen in the past few decades in response to poor leadership and the results of
said leadership (or lack thereof). Although the long-term difference seems to be relatively small
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according to the Gallup data, in recent years, as suggested by the Pew data, general
disillusionment with the Republican Party has far outweighed that of the Democratic Party,
which culminated in Trump’s presidency and Sanders’s losses in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic
Primaries. Both Democrats and Republicans have grown to be more skeptical of their respective
political parties, but it seems that Republican voters have been far more frustrated and
disappointed with the leadership of their own political party, thus allowing for a greater
summation of support for Trump than that of Sanders with Democrat voters. It seems both
parties are waning in terms of voter satisfaction, but this phenomenon has been accelerated with
the Republicans more so than with the Democrats. Because Democrat voters seem to have more
faith in their political party (although it is also declining), the party has been more resistant to
outsiders like Bernie Sanders, which is one of the many reasons why he didn’t win either
primary.
However, Sanders did come relatively close on both occasions to becoming the
Democratic nominee, even while running as a self-proclaimed ‘socialist’. This in and of itself
demonstrates how unsatisfied millions of Democrat voters have become with their party, as
many felt like turning to a party outsider like Sanders was a viable alternative to the status quo
leadership of the Democrat Party. Sanders’s position as an outsider acting outside of the interests
of the party leadership in many ways strengthened his connection to his young, progressive base.
However, this also damaged his prospects of becoming president because he failed to receive
support from much of the Democratic establishment, as exemplified by his small number of
endorsements. Sanders’s branding of himself as a ‘socialist’ also damaged his electability on a
national stage as most Americans still have a generally negative perception of socialism. This is
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also particularly damaging to his prospects because the black vote is necessary for the
Democratic nomination, and this group tends to be less liberal or left leaning than Sanders’s
progressive base.
Although Bernie Sanders didn’t achieve his goal of becoming President of the United
States of America, his movement has been incredibly impactful, especially amongst young
voters. He has shined a national spotlight on economic inequality in a way that many politicians
haven’t been able to do, and he changed the perception of socialism in America by comparing
his proposals to liberal, capitalist regimes such as Denmark and Sweden rather than actual
socialist regimes such as the former USSR. In many ways, he succeeded, but not enough to
ascend to the Oval Office. As mentioned in chapter three, Sanders lost for a variety of reasons,
such as his advocacy of socialism, his lack of endorsements, his failures to capture the black
vote, etc. How much each of these phenomena contributed to his two defeats would be an
interesting question to investigate, but this is outside the breadth of this study. What is, however,
imperative to understand, is that regardless of his defeats in the Democratic Primaries, Sanders
successfully utilized left-wing populism by pitting the American working class against the
economic elite to organize an incredibly popular movement. He did so knowing that it hadn’t
been done before (or at least not successfully), and the success of his movement (especially
amongst young voters) seems to have pushed the Democratic Primary leftward, as conversations
about wealth redistribution, higher taxes on high income earners, and universal healthcare have
become much more common in recent years. It’s important to note the difference between
Sanders and Trump here in so far as Trump’s impact has been that of a strangle-hold on the
Republican Party ever since his ascension to office, while Sanders has had a softer impact on the
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Democratic Party. The major difference seems to be that Trump’s impact was more so rhetorical
than anything, (as in he demanded and received loyalty from most GOP members but he
employed many typical Republican policies such as tax cuts) and Sanders’s impact seems to
have influenced the Democratic policy agenda. In short, most Republicans feel much more
compelled to bow to Trump while a relatively small number of Democrats feel like they must
endorse Sanders’s brand of progressive socialism in order to perform well politically. His
constant critiques of the neoliberal orthodoxy have resonated with millions of voters who feel
cheated or betrayed by the system when they find out that billion-dollar corporations such as
Amazon commonly pay no income taxes while regular citizens struggle to make ends meet
(Huddleston, 2019). Although Sanders is unlikely to run for office again due to his age, his
movement’s impacts are far from done. What this means for the future is uncertain. If
progressive, socialist candidates like Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, or Ilhan Omar continue
to push the Democratic Party leftward, then it is reasonable to assume that eventually one of
them will become president. Managing a congressional district, however, is very different from
managing an entire country, so the subsequent effects on the country are tough to predict. One
thing that isn’t so tough to predict, however, is that fringe, leftist candidates like Sanders are
likely to be more and more common as time progresses. Whether this is good or bad is for
history to decide.

Why this is Significant?
Voters have become increasingly disenchanted with the American political system and
the dominant parties that act within it, as exemplified by a preponderance of evidence
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demonstrating a decline in voter satisfaction. This has allowed populist candidates from the
margins, both right and left, to gain massive amounts of support by offering a populist critique of
many of the established centers of power that dictate policy for the rest of the country. Voters
seem to feel less connected to the people that lead them, as they feel they have been failed by
their leaders for decades. This is due to a myriad of phenomena such as the rising costs of living,
stagnant wages, the outsourcing of jobs, costly (and seldom beneficial) foreign wars, and the
concentration of wealth in the hands of an increasingly small group of elites. Much of populist
discourse suggests that a small group of corrupt individuals with disproportionate access to
economic and political power use such power in selfish ways that advance their interests while
neglecting the needs of the rest of America. This notion seems to be gaining traction, thus
making it politically viable in ways that it previously hadn’t been because many Americans are
increasingly perceiving this to be true. In a lot of ways, it is, as exemplified by the staggering
wealth inequality in America. It seems that one of the reasons populist rhetoric has become more
feasible is because many of the general ideas expressed by populists seem to reflect reality, as
many Americans have begun to notice problems like lax campaign finance laws and the
influence of money in politics.
As exemplified by Pippa Norris’s and Ronald Inglehart’s ‘Cultural Backlash’, however,
declining faith in political parties and their faulty leadership isn’t the only viable explanation for
the shift toward populist candidates such as Trump. There is an important cultural element to all
of this, as brought up in Chapter two’s mention of authoritarian attitudes amongst Trump voters.
Survey data from 1970 to present day indicate a large shift away from materialist values to postmaterialist values (Norris, Inglehart, 2019). Up until around 1970, most people in high-income
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Western societies prioritized materialist values such as economic growth and maintain order, but
after WWII, an unprecedented level of prosperity and affluence was achieved in these highincome societies, thus leading to an intergenerational shift toward post-materialist values such as
ethnic/racial diversity, environmentalism, gender equality, etc. (Inglehart, 2007). This shift has,
in many ways, represented a shift away from traditional values and cultural norms, and Norris
and Inglehart argue that this immense change has led to a cultural backlash (hence the name of
the book) amongst social conservatives that are generally upset at the pace of this societal change
and the cultural distance between the world they grew up in and the world they inhabit today
(Norris, Inglehart, 2019).
In this sense, Trump may possess a very distinct advantage over Sanders. Trump’s
reactionary rhetoric appeals to this large faction of discontent social conservatives by employing
regressive discourse that appeals to latent attitudes such as racism and xenophobia that still act as
salient, powerful political tools. His appeal to authoritarian attitudes seems to be what has
allowed Trump to gain a level of support that Sanders hasn’t been able to capture. In many ways,
authoritarianism didn’t win because of Trump (as it existed long before him and will exist long
after), rather Trump won because of authoritarianism. He successfully captured voters who
prioritized security, tradition, religiosity, and conformity over socially liberal values, and this
proved to be a winning strategy.
The authoritarian populist discourse employed by Trump isn’t unique to the United
States, however, as this phenomenon has been replicated in many other countries such as in the
cases of Marine le Pen of France and Viktor Orban of Hungary. This seems to imply that
discontent with the rapid shift in cultural values in the last half-century is a widespread trend that
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affects Western, affluent societies most. Perhaps the pace of change has been too fast or
revolutionary (in the metaphorical sense) and this backlash would not have happened if the shift
in values was more long-term and incremental. It could be that amongst older cohorts, socially
liberal values originally represented a welcome shift toward individuality and personal freedom,
but in recent years, they perceive many of the socially liberal values now being embraced to be
too distant from their value system, thus representing an attack on their way of life and the
countries they’ve grown up in and helped build. These questions are outside the purview of this
study, but the value of the answers to these questions could help one better understand many of
the issues discussed here.
In short, populism seems like it’s here to stay. Authoritarian populism currently seems to
be more politically viable in Western societies than left-wing populism considering the
resurgence of latent attitudes of authoritarianism. Trump has weaponized these latent attitudes in
an incredibly effective way, thus allowing him to ascend to the Oval Office. Sanders’s left-wing
populism has not allowed him to capitalize on these latent attitudes, thus culminating in his two
losses in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic Primaries. Although both politicians have some things
in common, more so in their economic stances (although there is considerable distance between
the two, obviously), they deviate greatly on cultural issues. In recent years, cultural issues have
become much more salient than the discussions regarding tax rates (which are more negotiable)
that made up much of the political discourse a few decades ago. Thus, Trump has weaponized
dissatisfaction amongst Republican voters with the GOP, latent authoritarian attitudes in the
populace, general discontent among voting cohorts with neoliberalism, and appeals to racism,
xenophobia, etc. to capture the Republican Party and make it bend to his will. What this means
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for the future is uncertain. One need only look toward history to see what happens when political
power is concentrated in individuals more so than parties, ideas, or systems. This could indeed be
incredibly dangerous for democracy, but Trump doesn’t care because it is good for him. This is
precisely why Donald Trump won and Bernie Sanders lost.
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